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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR.,

:

Case No. 900166

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. t
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing
is whether the Court overlooked relevant authority and misapplied
the law in concluding that attempted depraved indifference murder
does not exist in Utah because the "knowing" mental state
required for depraved indifference murder is not sufficient under
Utah's attempt statute.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr., was charged with one
count of second degree murder, a first degree felony, under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a)-(c) (1990), and two counts of
attempted second degree murder, a second degree felony, under
Utah Code Ann. SS 76-5-203(1)(a)-(c) and 76-4-101 (1990) (R. 68).
Defendant moved to dismiss the attempted second degree
murder counts that were based on the depraved indifference
alternative defined in section 76-5-203(1)(c) (R. 42-43).

The

trial court denied defendant's motion.
Defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal,
requesting review of the trial court's denial of the motion to
dismiss (R. 87-93).

This Court granted the petition.

On September 3, 1992, the Court issued an opinion which
held that attempted depraved indifference murder does not exist
in Utah because the "knowing" mental state required for depraved
indifference murder is not sufficient under Utah's attempt
statute.

State v. Vigil, No. 900166 (Utah Sept. 3, 1992) (a copy

is contained in the addendum to this petition).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State agrees with the statement of facts contained
in the Court's opinion.

Vigil, slip op. at 1-2.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In holding that attempted depraved indifference murder
does not exist in Utah because a knowing mental state is not
sufficient under Utah's attempt statute, the Court overlooked
substantial authority from the Model Penal Code, the Utah Code in
general, and its own case law.
The Model Penal Code, upon which Utah's attempt statute
is patterned, clearly adopts the view that an intentional or
knowing mental state is sufficient for attempt.

Both the

legislature and this Court have recognized, particularly in the
homicide context, that the intentional and knowing mental states
are equivalent and equally culpable.

Therefore, it is

unreasonable to interpret the term "intent," as it is generically
2

used in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(2) (1990), to limit the reach
of the attempt statute to offenses that require an intentional
mental state.
Consistent with the Model Penal Code and the
acknowledgement by the legislature and this Court that the
intentional and knowing mental states are equivalent and equally
culpable, the fairest interpretation of Utah's attempt statute is
that one can attempt to commit crimes that require either an
intentional or knowing mental state. Accordingly, attempted
depraved indifference murder exists in Utah.
INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has overlooked relevant authority or misapplied the law.

See

Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913).
The argument portion of this brief will demonstrate that the
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and
should be granted.
ARGUMENT
IN HOLDING THAT ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE MURDER DOES NOT EXIST IN UTAH,
THE COURT OVERLOOKED RELEVANT AUTHORITY AND
MISAPPLIED THE LAW
The Court correctly stated the issue presented in this
case:

"We are asked to determine whether proof of the 'knowing'

mental state required for depraved indifference homicide under
section 76-5-203(1)(c) of the Code is sufficient to satisfy the
mental state required by Utah's attempt statute found in section
76-4-101."

Viail, slip op. at 2.
3

It then construed section 76-

4-101(2) as limiting the reach of the attempt provision to
offenses that require an "intentional" mental state; one may not
be convicted of an attempt if the underlying or target offense
requires only a "knowing" mental state (as does depraved
indifference murder),

id. at 8-9.

The Court specifically

rejected the State's argument that the word "intent" in section
76-4-101(2) be interpreted to mean an intentional mental state or
one that is equivalent thereto (i.e., knowing mental state).

Id.

at 8.
The Court reached its conclusion that a "knowing"
mental state is insufficient despite acknowledging that the Model
Penal Code's attempt provision, upon which Utah's attempt statute
is patterned, "requires either intentional conduct or the belief
that the actor's conduct will result in the proscribed act."
at 6.

Id.

Indeed, the Model Penal Code clearly adopts the view that

a "knowing" mental state is sufficient for attempt, as
illustrated in the following comment:
Subsection (l)(b) [of § 5.01] provides
that when causing a particular result is an
element of the crime, as in homicide cases
... ., an actor commits an attempt when he
does or omits to do anything with the purpose
of causing "or with the belief that it will
cause" such result without further conduct on
his part. Thus, a belief that death will
ensue from the actor's conduct . . . will
suffice, as would a purpose to bring about
those results. If, for example, the actor's
purpose were to demolish a building and,
knowing that persons were in the building and
they would be killed by the explosion, he
nevertheless detonated a bomb that turned out
to be defective, he could be prosecuted for
attempted murder even though it was no part
of his purpose that the inhabitants of the
4

building would be killed.
It is difficult to say what the decision
would be under prevailing attempt principles
in a case of this kind. It might be held
that the actor did not specifically intend to
kill the inhabitants of the building; on the
other hand, the concept of "intent" has
always been an ambiguous one and might be
thought to include results that the actor
believed to be the inevitable consequence of
his conduct. In any event, the inclusion of
such conduct as the basis for liability under
Subsection (l)(b) is based on the conclusion
that the manifestation of the actor's
dangerousness is just as great — or very
nearly as great — as in the case of
purposive conduct. In both instances a
deliberate choice is made to bring about the
consequence forbidden by the criminal laws,
and the actor has done all within his power
to cause this result to occur. The absence
of any desire that the result occur is not,
under the circumstances, a sufficient basis
for differentiating between the two types of
conduct involved.
1 Amer. L. Inst., Model Penal Code and Commentaries,. 304-05
(1985).
The Model Penal Code's definition of "intent" as
including both intentional (or "purposive") and knowing conduct
is consistent with the generally accepted definition of that term
in the criminal law.

Black's Law Dictionary 373 (6th unabr. ed.

1990) defines "criminal intent" as follows:
The intent to commit a crime; malice, as
evidenced by a criminal act; an intent to
deprive or defraud the true owner of his

property. Includes those consequences which
represent the very purpose for which an act
is done, regardless
of the likelihood
of
occurrence, or are known to be
substantially
certain to result,
regardless
of desire*
[Emphasis added.]

In short, "criminal intent" includes

5

intentional and knowing mental states.
In light of the Model Penal Code's definition of
"intent" and the generally accepted definition of "intent" in the
criminal law, the Court's narrow interpretation of that term as
it is generically used in section 76-4-101(2) is unwarranted.
The Court erroneously considered itself bound to define "intent"
as used in subsection (2) in the same manner that "intentionally/
or with intent" are defined in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103(1)
(1990).

The terms appear in entirely different contexts and

plainly refer to different concepts.
Section 76-2-103(1) defines the intentional mental
state for puarposes of specific conduct designated as criminal
throughout the Code.

The section provides meaning for the terms

"intentionally, or with intent" when those terms are used to
define the mental state for the conduct associated with a
particular crime.

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103(1) (1990)

("A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or
explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages . . . . " ) .
On the other hand, the term "intent" is used
generically in section 76-4-101(2).
mental state for a particular crime.

It does not define the
Rather, it refers

generically to the "criminal intent" required for the underlying
or target offense attempted by the actor (which, of course, is
separately defined elsewhere in the Code).

The generic

definition of "intent" in the criminal law is that contained in
Black's Law Dictionary and adopted by the Model Penal Code (i.e.,
6

intentional or knowing).
Furthermore, defining "intent1* as used in section 76-4101(2) to include both intentional and knowing mental states is
consistent with the obvious legislative conclusion that those
mental states, while distinct, are equally culpable.

See, e.g..

Utah Code Ann. SS 76-5-202(1) (aggravated murder if actor
"intentionally or knowingly causes death of another") and 76-5203 (murder if actor "intentionally or knowingly causes the death
of another") (Supp. 1992); Utah Code Ann. SS 76-5-301(1) ("A
person commits kidnapping when he intentionally or knowingly . .
. . " ) , S 76-9-301 ("A person commits cruelty to animals if he
intentionally or knowingly . . . .") (1990).

For criminal

homicide, this Court has repeatedly recognized that the "knowing"
mens rea for depraved indifference murder is " ' e q u i v a l e n t to a
"specific intent" [or a purpose] to kill.'"

State v. Standiford,

769 P.2d 254, 261 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Bolsinaer, 699
P.2d 1214, 1220 (Utah 1985)).

Given the clear recognition by

both the legislature and this Court that the intentional and
knowing mental states are equivalent, it is unreasonable to
conclude that the legislature intended to limit the scope of the
attempt provision to crimes that require intentional conduct, and
to exclude those that require knowing conduct.
Indeed, even this Court could not completely accept its
narrow reading of section 76-4-101(2).

In footnote 5 of its

opinion, where State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982), is
discussed, the Court noted that "Maestas is still good law

7

insofar as it authorizes prosecution for attempted aggravated
murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of sorption
76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or h&owing
formulation of section 76-5-203(1) (a) •" Vicril, slip op. at 8 n.5
(emphasis added).

Retention of Maestas for th^t proposition

simply cannot be reconciled with the Court's holding that *
"knowing" mental state is not sufficient under the a£temp£
statute.
In sum, the most reasonable reading ftf Utah's attempt
statute is that one can attempt to commit crimes tjiat require
either an intentional or knowing mental state.

Accordingly,

attempted depraved indifference murder exists in Utah.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court showld grant
rehearing and modify its opinion to conform to the fairest
reading of Utah's attempt statute and this Court's own decisions,
particularly Standiford and Maestas.

Utah R. App. P. 35{c).

The State certifies that this petitiQn is presented in
good faith and not for delay.

f

RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^^day of September,
1992.
R. PAUL VAH DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
V
Assistant Attorney general

8

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc,
Attorney for Defendant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, this

of September, 1992.
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ADDENDUM

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr.,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 900166
FILED
September 3, 1992
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Attorneys:

R. Paul Van Dam, David B. Thompson, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for
defendant

ZIMMERMAN. Justice:
Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr., appeals from a trial court order
denying a motion he directed against two counts of an information
filed against him. He moved to amend one count of attempted
second degree murder and to dismiss a second count of attempted
second degree murder. The sole question presented on appeal is
whether the trial court correctly ruled that Vigil could be
prosecuted for attempted second degree murder under the depraved
indifference alternative of section 76-5-203(1)(c) of the Code.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (1990) (amended 1991).x We hold
that Utah does not recognize attempted depraved indifference
homicide and reverse the trial court order denying Vigil's
motion.
Because the facts are unimportant to the issue before
us, we will summarize them briefly. Vigil was charged with one
count of second degree murder, a first degree felony, id.
§ 76-5-203(1)-(2), and two counts of attempted second degree
murder, a second degree felony, id. §§ 76-5-203(1), -4-101,
1

In 1991, the legislature changed "second degree murder" to
simply "murder" and "first degree murder" to "aggravated murder."
1991 Utah Laws ch. 10, §§ 7-9 (codified as amended Utah Code Ann.
§§ 75-5-201 to -203 (Supp. 1992)).

-4-102(2). These counts arose out of his allegedly shooting a
rifle into a crowd on State Street in Salt Lake City. The
shooting resulted in the death of one person and the wounding of
two others. Before trial, Vigil moved to amend one count of the
information and dismiss another. The aim of the motion was
to delete from the information anything that would allow the jury
to find him guilty of attempted depraved indifference homicide.
The trial court denied the motion, whereupon Vigil petitioned
this court for permission to make an interlocutory appeal. We
granted his request and now consider the correctness of the trial
court's ruling.
We first state the standard of review. The question of
whether Utah recognizes attempted depraved indifference homicide
is purely a matter of statutory interpretation. Therefore, we
review the trial court's ruling for correctness and give no
deference to its conclusions. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,
424 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,
516 (Utah), cert, denied, ill S. Ct. 120 (1990); Provo City Corp.
v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989).
The issue before us is narrow. We are asked to
determine whether proof of the "knowing" mental state required
for depraved indifference homicide under section 76-5-203(1)(c)
of the Code is sufficient to satisfy the mental state required by
Utah's attempt statute found in section 76-4-101. If we find
that the "knowing" mental state required for depraved
indifference homicide is sufficient to satisfy the attempt
statute, the State will be able to prosecute a defendant for
attempt to commit depraved indifference homicide.
We begin with the two statutes. The first is the
second degree murder statute, which sets out several alternative
formulations of second degree murder. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-203(1) (1990) (amended 1991). The formulation we are
concerned with is subparagraph (1)(c), the depraved indifference
formulation. Subparagraph (1)(c), as construed by this court in
State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 263-64 (Utah 1988), and State
v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Utah 1984), provides that a
defendant may be convicted of second degree murder if he or she
killed another with a "knowing" mental state, i.e., if the
defendant knew his or her conduct created a grave risk of death
to another.2
2

In Standiford, we held that to convict a defendant of
depraved indifference homicide, the jury must find "(1) that the
defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a grave risk of death,
(3) that the defendant knew the risk of death was grave,
(4) which means a highly likely probability of death, and
(5) that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and
indifference toward human life." 769 P.2d at 264.

No. 900166
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The other statute of concern is the attempt statute,
section 76-4-101. The mental state required by the attempt
statute is found in the first two paragraphs, as indicated by
emphasis below:
(1) For purposes of this part a person
is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the offense,
he [or she] engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of the
offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct
does not constitute a substantial step unless
it is strongly corroborative of the actor/s
intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of
attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was
actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal
impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances
been as the actor believed them to be.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (emphasis added).
To determine whether the legislature intended to
recognize attempted depraved indifference homicide, we begin with
the statutes' plain language. We will resort to other methods of
statutory interpretation only if we find the language of the
statutes to be ambiguous. See Shurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814
P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 500
(Utah 1989) (per curiam).
Paragraph (1) of the attempt statute provides that an
attempt can occur whenever the actor acts with the "kind of
culpability otherwise required" for the completed crime and his
or her act is a "substantial step" toward committing the crime.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1). Because the criminal code
specifies four discrete mental states that may result in criminal
liability, i.e., intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence,
id. § 76-2-101(1), the language in paragraph (1) seems to suggest
that an attempt conviction may be based upon the incomplete
perpetration of any of the crimes in the Code.
On the other hand, paragraph (2) of the attempt statute
states that the defendant's conduct must be corroborative of his
or her "intent to commit the offense." Id. § 76-4-101(2). At

3
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first blush, this provision appears to contradict the broad
"culpability" language in paragraph (1). While paragraph (1)
seems to allow for any mental state so long as it falls within
the "kind of culpability otherwise required" for the underlying
offense, paragraph (2) seems to require a mental state of
"intent."
However, closer examination indicates that paragraphs
(1) and (2) are not contradictory. "Culpability," the term used
in paragraph (1), and "intent," the term used in paragraph (2),
are distinct concepts. Intent is a mental state. Blacks Law
Dictionary 415 (5th abr. ed. 1983). Culpability, on the other
hand, refers to blameworthiness, id. at 200; 25 C.J.S.
Culpability (1966), a value society assigns to particular
behaviors that it deems punishable. Culpability is an inclusive
term that comprehends action or omissions, the mental state with
which they are done, and the circumstances in which the acts or
omissions take place. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott,
Jr., Criminal Law § 24 (1979) [hereinafter Criminal Law!. Thus,
although culpability includes consideration of the actor/s mental
state, it is a much broader concept than intent. See 25 C.J.S.
Culpable (1966) (defining culpability as "deserving punishment
. . . or blame or censure," but noting that it does not
necessarily connote "guilt," "malice," or "guilty purpose").3
With this distinction in mind, we interpret paragraphs
(1) and (2) of section 76-4-101. In doing so, we rely on two
well-established rules of statutory construction. Cf. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-106 (requiring terms to be construed according to
their fair import). First, specific statutory provisions take
precedence over general statutory provisions. E.g., Osuala v.
Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). Second,
statutory provisions should be construed to give full effect to
all their terms. E.g., Shurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112.
Applying these two rules to the attempt statute
resolves the apparent contradiction between paragraphs (1) and
(2). The more specific requirement of intent in paragraph (2)
(i.e., "intent to commit the [underlying] offense") takes
precedence over the general culpability requirement in paragraph
(1) (i.e., "culpability otherwise required for the commission of
the [underlying] offense"). And to give the fullest possible
effect to the terms of paragraphs (1) and (2), we construe the
culpability requirement in paragraph (1) to refer to the

J

We are aware that culpability is sometimes used interchangeably with mental state.
However, we think that this usage
is imprecise.
No. 900166
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attendant circumstances, if any, of the underlying offense and
construe the intent language in paragraph (2) to limit the
attempt statute to offenses with a mental state of "intent." In
other words, attempt can be found for uncompleted offenses that

4

"Attendant circumstances" are those circumstances that may
be required to be present for criminal liability in addition to
the requisite physical conduct, or actus reus, and the mens rea
specified for the offense. See Criminal Law § 34, at 237,
240-41. In general, mens rea means "guilty mind," that attribute
which, along with physical conduct, was required for criminal
liability under common law, see id. § 27, at 191-92, and is now
required by statute except for strict liability offenses. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101(1) ("[N]o person is guilty of an
offense unless his [or her] conduct is prohibited by law and
. . . [h]e [or she] acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,
with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise
specified . . . . " ) . The mens rea is the mental state required
in all homicide offenses for criminal liability. See id.
§ 76-2-102 ("Every offense not involving strict liability shall
require a culpable mental state . . . . " ) ; id. § 76-5-201 ("A
person commits criminal homicide if he [or she] intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a
mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the
offense, causes the death of another human being, including an
unborn child.").
Occasionally, an offense may require a certain mental state
for an attendant circumstance. For example, under section
76-5-202(1)(k) of the current Code, a person is guilty of
aggravated murder ("first degree murder" under the 1990 statute)
if he or she intentionally or knowingly causes the death of a
police officer acting in an official capacity and the person knew
or "reasonably should have known" that the decedent was a police
officer. Id. § 76-5-202(1)(k). The mens rea element for this
offense is intent or knowledge, whereas the attendant
circumstance that the decedent was a police officer requires at
least a negligent mental state. Some offenses do not have
attendant circumstances, such as the intentional or knowing
formulation of murder ("second degree murder" under the 1990
statute), which requires only conduct that intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of another. Id. § 76-5-203(1)(a).
Other offenses that do have attendant circumstances may not
require a mental state for one or all of those circumstances. An
example of the latter type of offense is the depraved
indifference formulation of murder, which requires that the
defendant act "under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life." Id. § 76-5-203(1)(c). The
defendant's mental state under this provision is irrelevant to
the determination of this attendant circumstance; it refers
solely to objective circumstances. Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1045,
1047. See generally Criminal Law § 27, at 194-95.
5
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require "intent/1 even though those offenses have attendant
circumstances that require lesser mental states.
Our construction of Utah's attempt statute finds
support in the attempt provisions of the Model Penal Code ("MPC")
and the 1971 Proposed Federal Criminal Code (flPFCC"), both of
which served as bases for the Utah provision. See State v.
Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (noting that
the Utah attempt statute was modeled after the MPC version);
Loren Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline 169 (1973) (noting that
the Utah attempt statute was modeled after section 1001 of the
PFCC); cf. 1 National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws, Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws 351-52 (1970) (relying on the stated
purposes of the MPC attempt provision as the current penalogical
thinking) [hereinafter National Commission Working Papers].
Both the MPC and PFCC provisions include two phrases
regarding the requisite mental states for attempt that are the
same as or analogous to the provisions of the Utah attempt
statute. One phrase is the "kind of culpability otherwise
required" that is also used in paragraph (1) of the Utah attempt
statute. The other phrase specifies the mental state necessary
for the conduct that constitutes the substantial step, which
corresponds to the "intent" requirement in paragraph (2) of the
Utah attempt statute. See Model Penal Code § 5.01(1), (2),
reproduced in 1 Amer. L. Inst., Model Penal Code and Commentaries
295-96 (1985) [hereinafter MPC Commentaries1; Proposed Federal
Criminal Code § 1001(1), reproduced in 1 National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report of the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 6 (1971). The
commentaries to the MPC and PFCC attempt provisions indicate that
the clause requiring the "kind of culpability otherwise required"
for commission of the offense refers to the attendant
circumstances of the underlying offense and the requisite mental
states for those circumstances. See MPC Commentaries § 5.01, at
301, 303; National Commission Working Papers at 355. In
contrast, the commentaries make clear that both the MPC and PFCC
attempt provisions require a more culpable mental state than
recklessness for conduct that creates the substantial step. The
PFCC attempt provision requires intentional conduct, National
Commission Working Papers at 354 & n.6, and the MPC attempt
provision requires either intentional conduct or the belief that
the actor's conduct will result in the proscribed act. MPC
Commentaries § 5.01, at 303.
Despite the foregoing support for limiting the Utah
attempt provision to offenses requiring intent, the State argues
that we should define "intent" in paragraph (2) of the attempt
statute broadly to include purposeful intent and "equivalent"
mental states, specifically, that required for depraved
indifference homicide. The State reasons that this makes sense
from a policy standpoint because the culpability of a person
No. 900166

6

convicted of depraved indifference second degree murder is the
same as the culpability of a person convicted of intentional
second degree murder. See Standiford, 769 P.2d at 258; Fontana.
680 P.2d at 1045. In shortf the State argues that the degree of
the murder (i.e., "first" or "second") is a measure of the
societal judgment about the criminal's culpability and therefore
murders of equal degree should be treated similarly.
Notwithstanding the apparent logic of this argument,
the State's suggested interpretation of "intent" in paragraph (2)
of the attempt statute is contrary to the definition given to it
by the legislature. Section 76-2-103(1) of the Code states that
a person engages in conduct intentionally "with respect to the
nature of his [or her] conduct or to the result of his [or her]
conduct, when it is his [or her] conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-103(1) (emphasis added). Normally, we presume that when
the legislature defines a term of art and later uses that term in
the same body of statutes, it intends a consistent meaning.
E.g.. Cannon v. McDonald. 615 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1980).
Accordingly, the word "intent" as used in paragraph (2) of the
attempt statute should be read to mean "conscious objective or
desire." This meaning of the word "intent" obviously is
distinguishable from knowledge of the proscribed conduct or
result, which is the mental state required for depraved
indifference homicide.
Moreover, the State's position is inconsistent with our
prior decisions. In State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989), we
addressed the question of whether there could be attempted
felony-murder under subparagraph (d) of the second degree murder
statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(d) (Supp. 1989) (amended
1991). We said no, reasoning that "[t]he crime of attempted
murder does not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an
attempt to commit a crime requires proof of an intent to
consummate the crime . . . ." 785 P.2d at 393 (emphasis added).
In two other cases, we considered attempt in the
context of Utah's manslaughter statute, which sets out three
alternative formulations of manslaughter. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-205. Under this statute, manslaughter may arise where the
actor (i) recklessly causes death, id. § 76-5-205(1)(a),
(ii) causes death under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance, id. § 76-5-205(1)(b), or (iii) causes death under
circumstances where the actor reasonably believes that his or her
conduct is legally justifiable. Id. § 76-5-205(1)(c).
In State v. Norman. 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978), we
addressed the first two formulations. We held that an attempt
cannot be charged where the attempted crime is the form of
manslaughter described in subparagraph (a) of the statute because
that formulation requires only the mental state of recklessness,
whereas "[a]n attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the
7
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intent to commit that crime . . . .fl Id. at 239 (emphasis
added). Regarding subparagraph (b), we held that attempted
manslaughter is possible under this formulation because "the
killing may be intentional but due to mental or emotional
disturbance on the part of the defendant." Id. at 240 (emphasis
added).
We addressed the third formulation in State v. Howell,
649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982). There we held that attempted
manslaughter can be charged for a crime described under
subparagraph (c) of the manslaughter statute because the killing
proscribed under that provision must be "intentional." Id. at 94
(emphasis added). We again noted that "one cannot be guilty of
an attempt to commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea of the
completed crime is intentional conduct." Id. at 94 n.l (emphasis
added).5
At bottom, the State seeks to replace the word "intent"
in paragraph (2) of the attempt statute with, as it says, "intent
or a mental state that is equivalent thereto" and to modify or
reject the holdings of Bell, Norman, and Howell. Although it may
make sense to allow attempt for homicide offenses that are
presumably equal in culpability to intentional murder, we believe
that the most reasonable approach, in light of the statutory
language and our cases, is to read the word "intent" in
paragraph (2) of the attempt statute as that word is defined in
section 76-2-103(1).

5

In State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (1982), we rejected an
argument that the Utah attempt statute required a higher level of
"intent" than that required for first degree murder. In so
holding, we interpreted paragraph (1) of the Utah attempt statute
as making "clear that regardless of any requirements which the
common law may impose concerning %attempt' crimes, Utah law
requires only *the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the [completed] offense.,M Id. at 904 (brackets in
original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1953)).
Alternatively, we wrote that even if the Utah attempt statute
incorporated the common law requirement of intent, the mental
state required for first degree murder was sufficient to meet
that requirement. Id. at 905.
The first alternative rationale relied on in Maestas is
clearly inconsistent with our cases in Bell, Howellf and Norman
and with our holding in the instant case. Thus, that portion of
Maestas that conflicts with these cases and today's holding is
incorrect. However, we note that Maestas is still good law
insofar as it authorizes prosecution for attempted aggravated
murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section
76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or knowing
formulation of section 76-5-203(1)(a).
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Clarity is crucial to a just criminal law system.
Jurors are instructed to apply the language set forth in our
penal statutes to determine criminal liability. Articulating the
various mental states required for the various crimes in the Code
is difficult enough without giving multiple meanings to the word
"intent."
We hold that to convict a defendant of attempted second
degree murder, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had
a conscious objective or desire to cause the death of another.
Because the mental state required for depraved indifference
homicide falls short of that intent, the crime of attempted
depraved indifference homicide does not exist in Utah.
The order of the trial court denying Vigil's motion to
dismiss and amend is reversed.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice
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